



**United Nations Security Council
Counter-Terrorism Committee**

CTC UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE

BACKGROUND GUIDE ALEMUN 2026

TOPIC: Tackling the threat of state-sponsored terrorism and its impact on regional stability.

CHAIR: Daniel Villela and Benjamin Buchheim

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1. GREETING WORD

Dear delegates of the CTC Council,

Welcome to AleMUN 2026!

We are Daniel Villela and Benjamin Buchheim from Deutsche Schule Corcovado, and it is an incredible honour to be your chairs in this year's Counter Terrorism Committee. It is a pleasure to have you join us as we dive into a crucial debate on state-sponsored terrorism and its impact on international peace and regional stability.

The Counter Terrorism Committee is an essential body within the UN system, responsible for monitoring and strengthening global efforts to prevent and combat terrorism while ensuring respect for international law, including human rights, refugee law, and international humanitarian law. In this committee, we will examine how states may directly or indirectly support non-state armed groups, the consequences this has for regional security, and the challenges faced by the international community in holding these actors accountable.

This topic is highly relevant to today's global landscape, as it touches on sensitive issues such as geopolitical rivalries, proxy conflicts, ideological polarization, and the balance between national security and civil liberties. By debating these questions, you will not only deepen your understanding of international relations and security studies, but also develop your ability to think critically, negotiate, and propose realistic solutions that could, in theory, be implemented by real policymakers.

As we embark on this journey together, we are thrilled to serve as your moderators, guiding and facilitating the debates that will unfold during our sessions. The agenda has been carefully crafted to encourage substantive discussions, creative policymaking, and meaningful cooperation among delegates. We are excited to witness the innovative ideas, well-founded arguments, and collaborative spirit that you will bring to this committee. Please feel free to approach us with any questions, concerns, or suggestions you may have throughout your preparation and during the conference. We are here to support you and help create a respectful, engaging, and productive environment for everyone. Together, we will embark on a journey of diplomacy, dialogue, and shared learning, contributing in our own way to a more peaceful and secure world.

We wish you all good luck with your preparation and look forward to seeing you in the Counter Terrorism Committee at AleMUN 2026.

Sincerely,

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1. GREETING WORD

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2.CTC

2.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

The Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) was established by the United Nations Security Council shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in response to the sharp rise of international terrorism and its growing threat to global peace and security. It was created as part of a broader effort within the UN to coordinate, strengthen and monitor Member States' counter-terrorism measures under a single, more coherent framework. The CTC's central objective is to support States in preventing and combating terrorism while ensuring that all actions taken remain consistent with international law, including human rights, refugee law and international humanitarian law.

From its inception, the CTC has focused on assessing how States implement Security Council resolutions related to counter-terrorism, identifying gaps and good practices, and encouraging international cooperation. Over time, its work has expanded from emergency responses to terrorist attacks to a more long-term, preventive approach that addresses issues such as terrorist financing, border security, information-sharing and the role of civil society. Through dialogue, country visits, recommendations and capacity-building support, the Committee seeks to help governments develop effective and lawful counter-terrorism strategies that also respect fundamental freedoms.

Today, the CTC operates as a central forum within the UN system for discussing threats posed by terrorism in different regions, promoting coordination among Member States and relevant international organizations, and ensuring that counter-terrorism efforts do not undermine the values and norms of the United Nations. For delegates in this committee, understanding the mandate, structure and evolution of the CTC is essential for drafting realistic, implementable and legally sound solutions to the complex challenges posed by terrorism and, in particular, state-sponsored terrorism.

2.2 STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTER TERRORISM COMMITTEE

The Counter Terrorism Committee is a subsidiary body of the United Nations Security Council, composed of all members of the Council, both permanent and non-permanent. Its membership therefore includes the five permanent members (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States) as well as other non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly on a regional basis for two-year terms. The Committee is chaired by one of the non-permanent members, with one or more Vice-Chairs also selected from among the Council members.

The Committee's main role is to monitor and promote the implementation of Security Council resolutions related to counter-terrorism, in particular those adopted after the attacks of 11 September 2001. It provides guidance to Member States on strengthening their legal, institutional and operational frameworks against terrorism, while ensuring compliance with international law. The CTC reviews national reports, identifies gaps and good practices, and encourages technical assistance and capacity-building among States.

To support its work, the CTC is assisted by a specialized expert body known as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). CTED conducts assessments, country visits and analyses on behalf of the Committee, and helps coordinate with other UN entities, regional organizations and international partners. Through this structure, the CTC operates on a continuous basis throughout the calendar year, maintaining regular meetings, briefings and consultations in order to respond to evolving terrorist threats and challenges in a timely and coordinated manner.

2.3 CTC'S MISSION

The Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) is the United Nations Security Council body responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Council's resolutions on counter-terrorism, particularly those adopted in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks. Its core mission is to strengthen the capacity of all UN Member States to prevent and combat terrorism, while ensuring that counter-terrorism measures comply with international law, including human rights, refugee law and international humanitarian law. The CTC works closely with governments, international and regional organizations, and other UN entities to promote comprehensive and coordinated approaches to counter-terrorism.

The Committee's work focuses on several key priorities:

1. Encouraging States to adopt and implement robust legal frameworks criminalizing terrorism and related activities.
2. Promoting effective measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism.
3. Supporting improvements in border security, information-sharing and law-enforcement cooperation.
4. Highlighting the importance of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in all counter-terrorism efforts.

In carrying out this mission, the CTC is supported by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which conducts assessments, country visits and expert analysis to help identify gaps, needs and good practices. The Committee also plays a coordination role within the UN system, helping to align the work of different bodies and initiatives related to counter-terrorism and to avoid duplication. Despite significant progress over the past two decades, terrorism remains a serious and evolving threat, and many States still face challenges related to capacity, legislation, and balancing security with the protection of rights. The CTC therefore continues to monitor implementation, facilitate technical assistance and encourage dialogue to enhance global resilience against terrorism.

3. TOPIC BACKGROUND

3.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

State-sponsored terrorism has developed over decades as governments increasingly relied on non-state armed groups to pursue strategic, ideological and geopolitical objectives while avoiding the political and military costs of direct confrontation. Although support for irregular forces has existed throughout history, the modern concept of state-sponsored terrorism became especially prominent during the Cold War, when rival powers frequently backed proxy groups to expand influence, weaken adversaries and shape regional conflicts without engaging in open war.

During the 1970s and 1980s, several governments were accused of financing, training or sheltering militant organizations operating beyond their borders. Libya under Muammar Gaddafi became one of the most widely cited examples, as it was linked to militant activity across the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Libya was ultimately held responsible for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which killed 270 people and resulted in years of international sanctions, diplomatic isolation and compensation agreements following a lengthy legal and political process.

At the same time, the 1979 Iranian Revolution fundamentally reshaped Middle Eastern geopolitics. Iran's newly established Islamic Republic began supporting armed groups aligned with its revolutionary and anti-Western ideology, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Over time, Hezbollah evolved into one of the region's most influential and heavily armed non-state actors, serving both as a political movement and a paramilitary force.

The Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) also transformed the global terrorism landscape. Foreign governments, including the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, provided support to Afghan mujahideen factions fighting Soviet forces. While this assistance was aimed at countering Soviet expansion, the conflict contributed to the growth of transnational militant networks and foreign fighter movements that later formed the broader environment from which organizations such as Al-Qaeda emerged. Afghanistan under Taliban rule in the 1990s subsequently became a safe haven for Al-Qaeda leadership, culminating in the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States and the launch of the global "War on Terror."

Following 9/11, international counter-terrorism efforts intensified significantly. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, obligating member states to criminalize terrorism financing, strengthen border security, deny safe haven to terrorist actors and expand international cooperation. Additional mechanisms, including sanctions regimes, financial monitoring systems and intelligence-sharing frameworks, sought to disrupt the connections between governments, financiers and armed groups. Nevertheless, state sponsorship adapted rather than disappeared. Direct support increasingly shifted toward more deniable methods, including covert intelligence cooperation, proxy militias, arms smuggling networks and informal financial systems such as hawala transfers.

Throughout the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon during the 21st century, state sponsorship became deeply intertwined with regional rivalries, sectarian competition and proxy warfare. Governments frequently justified support for armed groups as assistance to "resistance movements," "national liberation struggles" or legitimate security partners, while opponents characterized the same actors as terrorist organizations. These disagreements over legitimacy, sovereignty and the definition of terrorism continue to complicate international responses and remain central challenges for the United Nations today.

3.2 CURRENT SITUATION OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

Around the world, state-sponsored terrorism, where governments provide funding, weapons, training, safe haven or political cover to designated terrorist groups, has become a defining feature of many regional conflicts and proxy wars. Prominent examples include Hezbollah (supported by Iran), Hamas (backed by Iran and historically Qatar), and the Houthis (supported by Iran), whose attacks on shipping lanes and Israel have escalated tensions across the Middle East. These dynamics have triggered intense concern from the UN Security Council, regional organizations and counter-terrorism experts about the erosion of international norms and the risk of wider escalation.

In early 2026, the threat remains acute in flashpoints like the Middle East, Sahel and Horn of Africa, where state sponsors exploit weak governance and sectarian divides to advance strategic goals. Hezbollah continues rocket attacks and border operations against Israel, while Hamas rebuilds capabilities in Gaza despite international sanctions. The Houthis, formally Ansar Allah, have expanded maritime strikes in the Red Sea, disrupting 15% of global trade and prompting multinational naval responses. Meanwhile, groups like ISIS remnants and Al-Qaeda affiliates still operate transnationally, though their direct state sponsorship is less overt than ideological alignment or tolerance by certain regimes.

State sponsorship often manifests through deniable mechanisms: cash transfers via hawala networks, arms smuggling, intelligence sharing, or diplomatic protection at the UN. Iran remains the most frequently cited state sponsor by Western governments, channeling billions through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to proxies that share its anti-Western and anti-Israel objectives. This support not only prolongs conflicts but also complicates attribution, as sponsors invoke "legitimate resistance" or "non-state actors" to evade sanctions and accountability under UNSCR 1373 and related resolutions.

Recent CTC/CTED assessments highlight how state-sponsored groups leverage drones, cyber tools and encrypted communications to amplify impact while maintaining plausible deniability for their backers. Attacks like the Houthis' targeting of Saudi oil infrastructure or Hezbollah's precision strikes demonstrate tactical evolution, forcing responses that balance military action with diplomatic pressure on sponsoring states. At the same time, some governments argue their support constitutes legitimate aid to "national liberation movements," creating deadlock in multilateral forums.

Despite sanctions and designations, economic and political incentives sustain this ecosystem. International cooperation mechanisms—like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) targeting terror finance, or Interpol's wanted notices—are making progress, but enforcement gaps persist in regions with limited capacity. Growing calls emphasize "disrupting the enablers": targeting mid-level financiers, corrupt officials and dual-use technology transfers. However, tensions between sovereignty, security imperatives and universal anti-terror standards remain unresolved, setting the stage for your committee's deliberations on attribution, enforcement and prevention

3.3 THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON REGIONAL STABILITY

State-sponsored terrorism profoundly destabilizes entire regions by weaponizing violence through proxies, prolonging conflicts and creating cycles of retaliation that undermine peace and security. Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis—receiving arms, funding and training from state actors such as Iran—conduct cross-border attacks, rocket barrages and maritime disruptions that draw in neighboring countries and risk broader escalation. These actions not only kill civilians and displace populations but also fracture alliances, inflame sectarian tensions, and turn local disputes into intractable regional wars.

The economic consequences are equally devastating. Houthi strikes on Red Sea shipping have disrupted 15% of global trade, spiking energy prices and starving conflict zones of humanitarian aid, while Hamas rocket campaigns and Hezbollah incursions paralyze border economies and deter investment. Refugee flows overwhelm neighboring states, and reconstruction costs drain national budgets, creating fertile ground for further radicalization and state failure. This proxy dynamic ensures no side can claim decisive victory, locking regions into perpetual low-intensity conflict.

Socially and politically, state sponsorship erodes trust in institutions and fuels extremism on all sides. Populations living under constant threat suffer psychological trauma, radicalization spikes as governments crack down indiscriminately, and ethnic/sectarian divides harden into permanent fault lines. Targeted states often respond with military overreach or their own covert operations, creating mirror-image accusations of terrorism sponsorship that paralyze diplomatic solutions. At a broader level, this shadow war weakens multilateral cooperation, empowers hardliners, and undermines the UN system's ability to mediate lasting peace.

The human cost compounds these effects: millions displaced, economies hollowed out, and governance structures collapsed under the weight of endless proxy battles. Addressing state-sponsored terrorism therefore demands not just sanctions or military pressure, but strategies to disrupt enablers, incentivize de-escalation, and rebuild trust across divided regions—challenges your committee must confront directly.

3.4 GEOPOLITICAL CONFLICT AND STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

Geopolitical rivalries increasingly drive states to sponsor terrorism as a low-cost, deniable tool for projecting power, undermining rivals and securing strategic advantages without risking direct confrontation. Iran's support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis exemplifies this approach, enabling Tehran to encircle Saudi Arabia and Israel, control key maritime chokepoints and export its revolutionary ideology while avoiding full-scale war.

Major power competition amplifies these dynamics. Russia has been accused of tolerating or enabling Chechen fighters and Wagner Group activities that blur into terrorism sponsorship in Syria and Africa, while maintaining strategic footholds. China's Belt and Road investments create dependencies that weaker states leverage for terror financing tolerance, and Turkey's complex relationship with Syrian factions shows how regional powers balance anti-ISIS cooperation with support for ideologically aligned militias.

Proxy sponsorship thrives in failed states and ungoverned spaces—think Yemen, Syria, Libya—where geopolitical contestants flood battlegrounds with arms and cash, guaranteeing stalemate. This calculus benefits sponsors: adversaries remain weakened, oil/gas routes stay contested, and refugee crises destabilize opponents internally. Hezbollah's border pressure keeps Israel defensive; Houthi maritime attacks force Riyadh's focus southward; Hamas rocket campaigns justify Gaza's isolation while sustaining Palestinian militancy.

The UN system struggles with these entrenched interests. Security Council vetoes block accountability, while sanctions regimes like 1373/2253 face enforcement gaps. Regional organizations splinter along bloc lines—GCC vs. Iran, NATO vs. Russia—making coordinated responses elusive. Delegates must therefore craft solutions that balance deterrence, incentives and multilateral pressure to disrupt this cycle of sponsorship and proxy warfare

3.5 IDEOLOGY, SECTARIANISM AND STATE SUPPORT TO NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

Ideology and sectarianism provide powerful justifications for states to support non-state armed groups, framing such backing as a moral or civilizational struggle rather than naked geopolitics. Iran leverages Shia identity politics to arm Hezbollah in Lebanon, framing it as resistance against "Zionist occupation," while simultaneously supporting Sunni Hamas through shared anti-Israel ideology—demonstrating how strategic pragmatism transcends sectarian lines when common enemies align.

Sectarian narratives fuel proxy wars across the Middle East and beyond. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have historically backed Sunni groups in Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian influence, while Iran positions its "Axis of Resistance" as a bulwark against Sunni extremism and Western imperialism. These ideological cloaks legitimize arms flows, training camps and funding networks, turning local militias into regional forces capable of sustaining indefinite conflict.

Non-state groups exploit this dynamic masterfully. Hezbollah blends Lebanese Shia particularism with anti-imperialist rhetoric to maintain domestic support; Hamas fuses Palestinian nationalism with Islamist ideology to attract Gulf donors; Houthis cast their rebellion as Zaydi revivalism against Saudi "aggression." States amplify these narratives through state media, religious endowments and diaspora networks, embedding proxy violence within broader cultural wars

. This fusion creates feedback loops: ideological victories (real or symbolic) strengthen sponsors politically at home, while battlefield setbacks demand escalated support to avoid credibility loss. The result is hardened positions, reduced compromise space and radicalization spirals that outlast individual leaders or regimes. Breaking these cycles requires not just material pressure but ideological counters—exposing contradictions in state narratives, promoting inclusive religious interpretations and building cross-sectarian coalitions that delegitimize violence as faith.

4. IMPORTANT FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE DEBATE

4.1 TOPICS TO FOCUS ON DURING THE DEBATE

- What constitutes "state-sponsored terrorism," and how can sponsorship be distinguished from legitimate support for allied groups or national liberation movements?
- How should international law address state responsibility for proxy violence while respecting sovereignty and avoiding escalation to direct conflict?
- Can regional organizations effectively counter state-sponsored terrorism, or must solutions remain centralized through UN mechanisms?
- What role should financial intelligence and sanctions play in disrupting terror financing networks without harming civilian economies?
- How can attribution mechanisms be strengthened to hold sponsors accountable without relying on intelligence from adversarial states?
- Should the UN Security Council reform veto procedures to enable decisive action against states that demonstrably support designated terrorist organizations?

4.2 GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

- What counter-terrorism laws and policies do your country have in place, and how do they address potential state sponsorship of terrorist groups?
- How does your country define the boundary between legitimate national security partnerships and support for designated terrorist organizations?
- What role has your country played in regional counter-terrorism efforts, including cooperation with the CTC, CTED or bilateral intelligence-sharing?
- How does your government respond to international accusations or evidence of supporting non-state armed groups?
- Is your country subject to, or an implementer of, UN sanctions regimes related to terrorism financing or arms embargoes? What are its compliance goals?
- What geopolitical, historical or ideological factors influence your country's stance on state-sponsored terrorism and proxy conflicts?

5. IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE COUNTRIES

5.1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States plays a central role in global counter-terrorism and is one of the main architects of the international framework against terrorism, including key Security Council resolutions and sanctions regimes. It publishes annual Country Reports on Terrorism that assess global trends and label certain governments as “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” a designation that currently includes Iran, Syria, Cuba and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In its own territory, recent US assessments emphasize a diversified threat environment, including ISIS-inspired attacks, Al-Qaida-aligned plots, and rising concerns about violent domestic extremism.

In foreign policy, the United States views Iran as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, accusing it of funding, arming and training groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and various militias across Iraq, Syria and Yemen through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Washington has repeatedly responded to attacks by these proxies with targeted military strikes, sanctions and diplomatic pressure, especially following Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and militia strikes on US personnel in the region. At the same time, critics argue that US partnerships with certain non-state armed groups—such as Kurdish forces in Syria—or its broader use of military force can blur lines in the eyes of some states, creating political debates about double standards and the definition of terrorism.

Domestically, the US has developed extensive legal and institutional tools to combat terrorism, including terrorist designation lists (Foreign Terrorist Organizations), financial sanctions, intelligence-sharing networks and a broad surveillance and law-enforcement apparatus. It also plays a leading role in multilateral forums, pressing allies to tighten counter-terrorism measures and to isolate states that support terrorist proxies.

[Country Reports on Terrorism 2023 - United States Department of State](#)

[Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State](#)

[Terrorism Financing | RAND](#)

[Terrorism & Extremism | Brookings](#)

[Terrorism and Counterterrorism | Council on Foreign Relations](#)

5.2 STATE OF ISRAEL

Israel faces persistent security threats from state-sponsored terrorist organizations, particularly Hezbollah (Iran-backed) and Hamas (Iran and Qatar-supported), which conduct rocket attacks, tunnel infiltrations and suicide bombings against civilian and military targets. The country maintains one of the world's most advanced counter-terrorism architectures, including the Iron Dome missile defense system, extensive border security infrastructure and proactive intelligence operations targeting sponsor networks abroad. Israel designates Iran as the primary state sponsor orchestrating multi-front proxy warfare through its "Axis of Resistance."

In regional dynamics, Israel views state sponsorship as an existential threat that justifies preemptive military action, targeted assassinations of militant leaders and cyber operations against Iranian nuclear and terror infrastructure. Jerusalem has conducted hundreds of airstrikes in Syria targeting Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah, while maintaining a policy of maximum pressure on Hamas through Gaza blockade and periodic ground operations. Critics accuse Israel of disproportionate responses that fuel radicalization cycles, while supporters argue these measures are essential deterrence against annihilationist ideologies.

Domestically, Israel balances robust counter-terrorism laws—including administrative detention and movement restrictions—with democratic institutions and judicial oversight. The country actively engages CTC reporting and shares intelligence on state sponsorship through bilateral partnerships, particularly with the United States. Internationally, Israel pushes for stronger sanctions against terror sponsors and recognition of Hezbollah/Hamas as terrorist entities rather than "resistance movements."

[Home Page | INSS](#)

[Israel Security Agency - Terrorism Portal](#)

[Israel and Hamas at War | Top Headlines on Israel and Hamas at war | Reuters](#)

[Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs](#)

5.3 UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The United Kingdom maintains a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy known as CONTEST, which emphasizes preventing radicalization, pursuing terrorists, protecting the public, and preparing for attacks. London proscribes 81 organizations as terrorist groups, including Hezbollah's military wing, Hamas' Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and Al-Shabaab, and works closely with the US to designate state sponsors like Iran and Syria. The UK has faced domestic attacks linked to ISIS inspiration and international plots, prompting robust legislation like the Terrorism Act 2000 and enhanced surveillance powers.

Internationally, the United Kingdom views Iran as the principal state sponsor of terrorism in Europe and the Middle East, citing IRGC plots against dissidents on British soil, Hezbollah reconnaissance of Jewish targets in London, and proxy militia attacks on UK forces in Iraq and Syria. The UK participates in naval coalitions protecting Red Sea shipping from Houthi strikes and supports sanctions regimes while pushing for stricter enforcement against terror financing through hawala networks and cryptocurrency. Critics note London's historical tolerance of Islamist preachers and Gulf donors, though recent years have seen crackdowns.

Domestically, the UK balances stringent counter-terrorism measures with rule-of-law protections through judicial oversight and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The country actively engages the CTC through detailed reporting, technical assistance programs, and intelligence-sharing alliances like Five Eyes.

[Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations - GOV.UK](#)

[UK watchdog says counterterrorism law could hit protests, free speech | Reuters](#)

[National Counter Terrorism Security Office - GOV.UK](#)

[Lebanon 2025: Plans to disarm Hezbollah - House of Commons Library](#)

5.5 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Germany maintains one of Europe's most comprehensive counter-terrorism frameworks, combining advanced intelligence capabilities, strict gun control laws, and robust deradicalization programs. Berlin faces threats from multiple sources, including ISIS returnees, right-wing extremists, and occasional plots linked to foreign state actors. The country has proscribed numerous organizations as terrorist entities, including Hamas, Hezbollah's military wing, and PKK affiliates, while actively participating in EU and UN sanctions regimes targeting state sponsors like Iran and Syria.

Internationally, Germany views state-sponsored terrorism primarily through the lens of Iranian activities in Europe, including foiled assassination plots against dissidents and Jewish targets on German soil. Berlin has expelled Iranian diplomats, sanctioned IRGC-linked entities, and joined naval operations protecting Red Sea shipping from Houthi attacks. The government also monitors Russian hybrid threats, including Wagner Group's activities in Africa and Syria that blur into terrorism sponsorship. Germany provides significant technical assistance to CTC reporting and capacity-building programs, particularly in the Western Balkans and North Africa.

Domestically, Germany balances stringent security measures with strong constitutional protections for civil liberties. The country invests heavily in preventing radicalization through community engagement, online content moderation, and rehabilitation programs for returning foreign fighters. Berlin actively engages with moderate Muslim communities to counter Salafist networks while maintaining strict oversight of foreign funding to mosques and cultural centers.

[Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz - Foreign extremism \(excluding Islamist extremism\)](#)

[Security and Defence - Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung](#)

[Israel and Hamas at War | Top Headlines on Israel and Hamas at war | Reuters](#)

[UN Office of Counter-Terrorism | Office of Counter-Terrorism](#)

5.6 KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has transformed its counter-terrorism posture since the early 2000s, when Al-Qaeda attacks on the Kingdom prompted sweeping domestic reforms, including a dedicated counter-terrorism center, financial intelligence unit, and rehabilitation programs for returning fighters. Riyadh now faces threats from Iran-backed proxies like the Houthis, who conduct missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and population centers, as well as ISIS remnants and regional AQAP operations.

Internationally, Saudi Arabia positions itself as a frontline state against Iranian state-sponsored terrorism, documenting extensive Houthi weapons systems traceable to IRGC supply chains. The Kingdom leads the GCC coalition in Yemen to restore legitimate government against what it terms an Iranian proxy occupation, while supporting anti-Assad rebels in Syria and maintaining a hardline stance against Muslim Brotherhood affiliates designated as terrorists. Riyadh has faced Western accusations of past tolerance toward private donors funding extremism, though recent years show aggressive crackdowns on terror financing.

Domestically, Saudi Arabia maintains absolute monarchy with Sharia-based governance and strict limitations on political dissent, justified as counter-terrorism imperatives. The government monitors religious discourse rigorously and exports Salafist ideology through global religious endowments, creating tensions with Western partners. Despite Vision 2030 reforms, the Kingdom remains highly sensitive to Iranian encirclement and maintains extensive border security against proxy incursions. For delegates, Saudi Arabia represents a major Sunni power confronting existential threats from Shia state sponsorship while navigating complex relationships with Western allies over human rights and religious influence.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has faced accusations from some governments, analysts and human rights organizations regarding the global exportation of conservative Salafist and Wahhabi religious ideologies through charities, schools and religious institutions. Critics argue that, although the Saudi government officially opposes terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, aspects of these ideological networks have historically contributed to environments in which extremist narratives could spread. Saudi officials strongly reject accusations of direct state support for terrorism and emphasize the Kingdom's extensive counter-terrorism cooperation, financial crackdowns and deradicalization initiatives implemented in recent years.

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen>

[Saudi Arabia | Council on Foreign Relations](#)

[Who is fighting in Yemen? | Reuters](#)

<https://www.brookings.edu/regions/middle-east-north-africa/saudi-arabia/>

5.7 REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

Iraq remains one of the most terrorism-affected countries globally, serving as both battleground and transit hub for multiple armed groups including ISIS remnants, Iran-backed Shia militias (PMF), and Al-Qaeda affiliates. The country's weak central governance and sectarian divisions create fertile ground for proxy conflicts, with Iran exercising significant influence through Popular Mobilization Forces that receive IRGC funding, training and operational direction while officially integrated into state security structures.

The Iraqi government struggles with dual loyalty among security forces, as Shia militia commanders often prioritize Tehran's strategic objectives over Baghdad's sovereignty. Iran-backed groups have conducted hundreds of rocket and drone attacks on US-led coalition bases since October 2023, prompting American retaliatory strikes while simultaneously fighting ISIS to maintain domestic legitimacy. Turkey conducts cross-border operations against PKK affiliates, while Iran uses Iraqi territory for weapons transfers to Syria and Lebanon.

Domestically, Iraq faces governance collapse risks from militia proliferation, oil revenue disputes, and corruption that undermines counter-terrorism capacity. The government reports to the CTC but implementation remains uneven due to militia veto power over security policy. Baghdad walks a tightrope between Washington (anti-ISIS cooperation) and Tehran (sectarian solidarity), creating paralysis on state sponsorship accountability.

<https://mofa.gov.iq/2025/57182/>

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/>

[Iraq | Council on Foreign Relations](#)

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq>

5.8 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Iran is designated by the United States and numerous Western governments as the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, channeling billions through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to maintain a regional "Axis of Resistance" comprising Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Houthis, and various Shia militias across Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Tehran frames this support as legitimate resistance against US hegemony, Israeli occupation, and Sunni extremism, rejecting terrorism accusations as politically motivated while maintaining extensive training camps, weapons factories, and financial networks.

The IRGC orchestrates synchronized proxy attacks including Hezbollah rocket barrages from Lebanon, Hamas operations from Gaza, Houthi maritime strikes in the Red Sea, and militia rocket attacks on US positions in Iraq and Syria. Iran employs deniable mechanisms—hawala transfers, dual-use civilian shipments, diplomatic pouches—to circumvent sanctions while maintaining strategic depth that encircles Saudi Arabia and Israel. Tehran vetoes UN accountability through Russian/Chinese Security Council alliances and counters Western sanctions with oil smuggling and cryptocurrency terror financing.

Domestically, Iran maintains absolute theocratic control through Basij militias and morality police while facing periodic protests that the regime attributes to foreign terrorists. The government rejects CTC jurisdiction as Western imperialism and positions itself as victim of state terrorism from Israel and the United States.

<https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/>

<https://www.iranwatch.org/library/governments/iran/ministry-foreign-affairs/iran-missile-strikes-idlib-erbil-line-defending-national-sovereignty-security>

<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/iran-wants-lebanon-included-any-ceasefire-sources-say-2026-03-25/>

<https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/irans-network-proxies-and-partners-middle-east>

5.9 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

China maintains a comprehensive counter-terrorism framework focused primarily on domestic threats from Uyghur separatist groups, which Beijing designates as "East Turkestan Islamic Movement" (ETIM) terrorists with alleged Al-Qaeda and ISIS ties. The government justifies mass surveillance, internment camps, and cultural assimilation policies in Xinjiang as essential counter-terrorism measures, reporting significant success in eliminating attacks while facing Western accusations of genocide and human rights abuses.

Internationally, China rejects terrorism sponsorship accusations while critics highlight Beijing's tolerance of terror financing through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in unstable regions. Pakistani terror groups reportedly receive safe passage and economic support via CPEC corridors, while Chinese diplomatic protection has shielded certain Middle Eastern actors at the UN. Beijing aligns with Russia and Iran in Security Council debates, blocking Western initiatives against state sponsors while promoting its "three evils" framework (terrorism, separatism, extremism) as the global standard.

Domestically, China operates one of the world's most advanced surveillance states with facial recognition, social credit systems, and AI-driven threat prediction integrated into counter-terrorism. The government engages minimally with CTC reporting, prioritizing bilateral security cooperation over multilateral frameworks.

<https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-expresses-deep-concern-about-israels-attacks-iran-urges-de-escalation-2025-06-13/>

<https://www.brookings.edu/regions/asia-the-pacific/china/>

Full text: [China's Legal Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism](#) 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室

From Xinjiang to the frontier: China's evolving counterterrorism strategy.

5.10 RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Russia maintains an extensive counter-terrorism apparatus developed through decades of conflict with Chechen separatists and more recent ISIS-inspired attacks, including the 2024 Crocus City Hall massacre claimed by ISIS-K. Moscow designates numerous groups as terrorists, including ISIS affiliates, Ukrainian nationalist battalions, and Western-backed NGOs accused of extremism. The country employs harsh domestic measures including filtration camps, indefinite detention, and internet censorship justified as counter-terrorism necessities.

Internationally, Russia rejects state sponsorship accusations while facing Western claims of enabling terrorism through Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) operations in Syria, Mali, and Central Africa that blur mercenary and terrorist boundaries. Moscow maintains military bases in Syria that protect Assad while tolerating Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah and provides diplomatic cover for state sponsors in Security Council vetoes. Critics highlight Russian tolerance of North Korean arms transfers and cryptocurrency terror financing through Moscow exchanges.

Domestically, Russia operates centralized FSB counter-terrorism coordination with regional anti-extremist centers and extensive surveillance of Muslim communities. The government engages selectively with CTC reporting while promoting its counter-terrorism model as superior to Western approaches.

[Information portal of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee](#)

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/>

<https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria>

<https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika>

5.12 LEBANESE REPUBLIC

Lebanon serves as the primary base for Hezbollah, Iran's most powerful and capable proxy force, which maintains a state-within-a-state through extensive military infrastructure, parallel governance structures, and Iranian funding estimated at \$700 million annually. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) officially cooperate with international counter-terrorism efforts while lacking capacity to confront Hezbollah, creating de facto government tolerance of state-sponsored terrorism despite formal disassociation. Hezbollah's 150,000+ rocket arsenal and fortified positions threaten Israel while dominating Lebanese politics through veto power and Shia community control.

Internationally, Lebanon receives substantial US and Western counter-terrorism assistance focused on LAF professionalization and border security against ISIS/Sunni extremists, while maintaining strategic ambiguity toward Hezbollah to avoid civil war. The government engages minimally with CTC reporting due to Hezbollah's parliamentary blocking power, while UNIFIL monitors southern border violations. Beirut faces sanctions and pressure over Hezbollah financing through Lebanese banks and the captive Central Bank.

Domestically, Lebanon's sectarian power-sharing system paralyzes decisive action against Hezbollah dominance, with economic collapse exacerbating militia social service provision that cements popular support. The 2020 Beirut port explosion exposed Hezbollah munitions storage while governance vacuum enabled terror financing.

5.13 REPUBLIC OF INDIA

India faces persistent terrorist threats from Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks and 2019 Pulwama bombing, which New Delhi accuses Islamabad of sponsoring through ISI safe houses, funding and training infrastructure in Punjab and Kashmir. Domestically, India combats Naxalite Maoist insurgency, Northeast separatists, and ISIS-inspired modules while maintaining one of the world's largest counter-terrorism intelligence networks through the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and Multi-Agency Centre.

Internationally, India rejects Pakistan's terrorism accusations as deflection while pushing UN sanctions against LeT/JeM leaders and pressing for Masood Azhar's global terrorist designation (achieved 2019). New Delhi engages actively with CTC reporting, provides technical assistance to neighbors, and conducts surgical strikes across the Line of Control in response to cross-border attacks. India balances relations with Iran (Chabahar port) and Gulf states while maintaining strategic autonomy from Western sanctions regimes.

Domestically, India maintains robust counter-terrorism laws including UAPA detention powers and National Security Act while facing criticism over Kashmir security measures and minority community profiling. The government monitors Pakistan-linked hawala networks and Chinese dual-use technology transfers to terror groups.

<https://www.satp.org/>

<https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan>

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/>

<https://www.brookings.edu/regions/asia-the-pacific/india/>

5.14 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan maintains complex counter-terrorism dynamics as both victim of major attacks by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qaeda affiliates, and accused state sponsor of anti-India groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operating from safe havens in Punjab and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) faces longstanding Western accusations of providing funding, training facilities and strategic guidance to these groups for operations against India, including the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 166 people.

Internationally, Pakistan rejects state sponsorship accusations as Indian propaganda while cooperating selectively with US drone operations against TTP and providing logistical support for NATO supply lines to Afghanistan. Islamabad engages with CTC reporting primarily on domestic threats while blocking UN sanctions against LeT/JeM leaders through diplomatic protection. Relations with Afghanistan deteriorated after Taliban takeover as TTP sanctuaries proliferated across the border, prompting Pakistani airstrikes and accusations of Kabul's complicity.

Domestically, Pakistan operates extensive military intelligence networks monitoring sectarian extremists (Sipah-e-Sahaba) and Baloch separatists designated as terrorists, while maintaining political ambiguity toward Kashmir-focused groups. The National Counter Terrorism Authority coordinates federal-provincial responses amid chronic underfunding and judicial pushback against military courts.

Counter-Terrorism & Anti-Money Laundering

[https://pakun.org/How Pakistan Became the Iran War's Unlikely Peace Negotiator |.Council on Foreign Relations](https://pakun.org/How-Pakistan-Became-the-Iran-War's-Unlikely-Peace-Negotiator-|.Council-on-Foreign-Relations)

<https://www.nation.com.pk/04-May-2026/pakistan-seeks-role-regional-security-stabiliser-military-strength-diploma>

5.15 STATE OF QATAR

Qatar maintains a unique position in counter-terrorism debates as both a major financial hub hosting US Central Command's forward headquarters and accused by neighbors of hosting and funding Hamas political leadership alongside Muslim Brotherhood figures. Doha provides extensive humanitarian aid to Gaza while maintaining open diplomatic channels with designated terrorist organizations, framing this engagement as essential conflict mediation rather than sponsorship. The Al-Udeid Air Base hosts American counter-terrorism operations while Qatari state media Al Jazeera faces accusations of amplifying terrorist propaganda.

Internationally, Qatar rejects terrorism sponsorship accusations following the 2017 GCC blockade, emphasizing compliance with FATF standards and CTC reporting on terror financing transparency. Doha positions itself as neutral mediator between Hamas, Israel, and Western powers, hosting ceasefire negotiations while maintaining economic ties to Iran through shared North Field gas reserves. Critics highlight Qatari charitable organizations with historical terror financing links, though recent regulatory crackdowns address these concerns.

Domestically, Qatar operates absolute monarchy with sophisticated financial intelligence monitoring hawala networks and expatriate remittances under international scrutiny. The government balances Wahhabi religious establishment with pragmatic foreign policy while hosting Hamas leaders who coordinate Iranian funding flows.

<https://mofa.gov.qa/en>

[The State of Qatar Reaffirms Its Approach to Combating Terrorism is Based on Prevention and Addressing the Root Causes](#)

[Qatar: Extremism and Terrorism](#)

[Counter Extremism Project Qatar - United States Department of State](#)

5.16 REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYE

Türkiye maintains an extensive counter-terrorism apparatus primarily focused on the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its Syrian affiliates YPG/PYD, which Ankara designates as terrorist organizations despite US cooperation with these groups against ISIS. The country conducts cross-border operations into Syria and Iraq targeting PKK infrastructure while combating domestic ISIS cells and far-right extremists. Türkiye proscribes Hamas as terrorists but maintains complex relations with its leadership, balancing anti-Israel solidarity with counter-terrorism cooperation.

Internationally, Türkiye rejects accusations of state sponsorship while facing Western criticism for tolerance toward Syrian Salafist groups during early civil war phases and hosting Muslim Brotherhood figures. Ankara engages actively with CTC reporting on PKK threats and provides technical assistance to Central Asian states while blocking EU sanctions against certain Palestinian factions. Relations with Iran remain pragmatic despite sectarian differences, with trade continuing amid mutual accusations of proxy support.

Domestically, Türkiye operates centralized MIT intelligence coordination with military drone operations and mass surveillance capabilities justified as counter-terrorism necessities. The government monitors Gülen movement networks designated as FETO terrorists while facing EU criticism over judicial independence and media freedom.

[Türkiye - United States Department of State](#)

[Turkey's Repositioning in the Middle East's Emerging Order](#)

[Turkey's Approach to Countering Terrorism | Counter Extremism Project](#)

[What is behind Turkey's staunch support for Hamas in Gaza?](#)

5.17 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The United Arab Emirates maintains one of the world's most sophisticated counter-terrorism architectures, leveraging advanced surveillance technology, financial intelligence dominance, and strategic military partnerships. Abu Dhabi designates numerous groups as terrorists including Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, Houthis, and Lashkar-e-Taiba while leading regional efforts against Iranian proxy expansion. The UAE participates actively in US-led naval coalitions protecting Red Sea shipping from Houthi attacks and provides extensive technical assistance to CTC capacity-building programs.

Internationally, the UAE positions itself as a frontline state confronting Iranian state-sponsored terrorism through Houthi missile attacks and maritime threats. Abu Dhabi led the anti-Houthi coalition alongside Saudi Arabia while developing Abraham Accords normalization with Israel to counter shared Iranian threats. The Emirates aggressively combats terror financing through its international financial center status, implementing strict FATF-compliant measures while monitoring hawala networks and cryptocurrency flows linked to designated groups.

Domestically, the UAE operates absolute monarchy with comprehensive security apparatus preventing domestic radicalization through economic co-optation, religious oversight, and preemptive detention. The government exports its counter-terrorism model regionally while maintaining strategic ambiguity toward certain Salafist groups aligned against Muslim Brotherhood.

[Arab Parliament Condemns Iranian Missile and Drone Strikes on UAE as 'Terrorist Attacks'](#)

[United Arab Emirates - United States Department of State](#)

[Foiled plot in UAE: Sheikh Abdullah says nation will continue to fight terrorism | Khaleej Times](#)

[UAE Expands Terror List with Ties to Muslim Brotherhood - Dubai Times](#)

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[1990 Global Terrorism: State-Sponsored Terrorism](#)

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Good luck, delegates!